

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

Part IV – The Diagonal Lemma

Computability and Logic

Part IV - Diagonal Lemma

- The final step in Gödel's proof was to prove the Diagonal Lemma:
- For any theory T that contains PA, and for any formula $\mathbf{A(x)}$, there exists a sentence G such that $T \models \mathbf{G} \leftrightarrow \mathbf{A(g)}$, where g is the Gödel number of \mathbf{G} .
- In other words, for any formula (property) $\mathbf{A(x)}$, there is a sentence that says "I have property $A(x)$ "

Proof of Diagonal Lemma I

- The diagonalization of an expression $\mathbf{A(x)}$ (of L_A) is the expression $\exists \mathbf{x} (\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{a} \wedge \mathbf{A(x)})$, where \mathbf{a} is the Gödel number of $\mathbf{A(x)}$.
- Consider the function $\text{diag}(x) =$ the Gödel number of the expression that is the diagonalization of the expression with Gödel number x .
- It can be easily shown that this is a recursive function.
- Hence, there is a formula $\varphi_{\text{diag}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ such that $\varphi_{\text{diag}}(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{n})$ is true iff n is the Gödel number of the diagonalization of the expression whose Gödel number is m .
- Moreover, this function is representable in PA, and hence in T, i.e. if $\text{diag}(m) = n$ then $T \models \forall \mathbf{y} (\varphi_{\text{diag}}(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{y}) \leftrightarrow \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{n})$

Proof of Diagonal Lemma II

- Let $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{x})$ be the formula $\exists \mathbf{y} (\varphi_{\text{diag}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \wedge \mathbf{B}(\mathbf{y}))$, with Gödel number a .
- Let G be the diagonalization of $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{x})$, i.e. G is the sentence $\exists \mathbf{x} (\mathbf{x} = a \wedge \exists \mathbf{y} (\varphi_{\text{diag}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \wedge \mathbf{B}(\mathbf{y})))$
- So G basically says: “The diagonalization of $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{x})$ has property B ”.
- But since the diagonalization of $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{x})$ is G itself, G ends up saying “I have property B ”

Gödel Sentences

- We saw from the Gödel numbering part that for any recursive set of axioms T there is a formula $\varphi_{\text{provable}}(x)$ saying that expression with number x is not provable from axioms T .
- By the Diagonal Lemma, there must therefore be a sentence G such that $T \models G \leftrightarrow \neg\varphi_{\text{provable}}(g)$
- This G is called the “Gödel sentence”, which basically says “I am not provable from T ”.

Why any “strong enough” and Sound T is Incomplete

- If G_T is false, then it can be proven from T. But that would mean that T is not sound. Since T is sound, that means that G_T is true. So it is true that G_T is not derivable from T. So, there is a true statement that cannot be derived from T: T is incomplete!